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The article opens with a brief review of the UK's central place in European security 
and defence but highlights its ambivalent position towards security and defence 
cooperation within the EU. It tracks the impact of Brexit on EU debates and the 
catalytic effect that this appears to have had on a substantive acceleration in EU 
defence cooperation over the last three years. After highlighting the need for a 
continued security and defence partnership, the article goes on to identify – first from 
an EU and then from a UK perspective – the possible scenarios for such cooperation. 
It notes the very limited intersection of these scenarios and sets out the likely horizon 
for future negotiations. It concludes by suggesting that both partners – while suffering 
a net loss as a result of Brexit – nonetheless have vital strategic interests in crafting a 
new bilateral partnership.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The decision of the United Kingdom electorate in the 2016 referendum to 
withdraw from the European Union poses significant challenges to both the 
UK as a foreign policy actor and to the future of the Union's Common 
 
* Ben Tonra is Full Professor of International Relations at the UCD Dublin School 
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Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP). The goal of this article is to assess where security and defence 
"fits" in the Brexit negotiations, the UK's place and role in this major policy 
portfolio and the options available – and their implications – for future EU-
UK cooperation in this area. The argument presented is that 
notwithstanding the UK's central place within European security and its 
success in defining the shape of EU defence cooperation to date, the 
prospects for future cooperation are limited in the short to medium term. For 
both partners this represents a substantial loss of capacity and influence, but 
domestic UK politics and an EU determination to defend the rights of 
members over the interests of 'third countries' leaves very little room for 
manoeuvre. This of course is despite the fact that both partners face the same 
threat assessment and that cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral 
levels will continue and likely even deepen. 
The UK was an early supporter of foreign and later defence policy 
cooperation in the EU and is arguably, by default, one of the major architects 
of the CFSP and CSDP as we know them today.1 In part this is for negative 
reasons in as much as the UK was determined – alongside others – to ensure 
that EU cooperation in this realm remained firmly intergovernmental in 
nature and that it never cut across the primacy of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). As a major military power – with both capacity and 
will to deploy globally – the UK has also traditionally represented a 
significant proportion of the overall collective military capacity of the EU. In 
recent years, however, the UK – at both political and operational levels – has 
pulled back from EU engagement. In the last years of its membership, the 
UK was only the fifth largest contributor to CSDP missions after France, 
Italy, Germany and Spain, accounting for just 3.6 per cent of contributions to 
 
1 Sven Biscop, 'The UK and European defence: leading or leaving?' (2012) 88(6) 
International affairs 1297-1313; Nicholas Wright, 'Winding Up the Machine: How 
the UK Engages with the CFSP' in  Nicholas Wright (ed) The EU's Common Foreign 
and Security Policy in Germany and the UK (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) 87-109; 
Douglas Hurd, 'Developing the common foreign and security policy' (1994) 70(3) 
International Affairs 421-428. 
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EU military operations.2 This of course has to be set against the fact of the 
UK's prioritisation of its NATO commitments and Britain's ongoing and 
leading role in European security and defence more broadly, in both bilateral 
and other multilateral fora. This apparent contradiction has been a function 
of both the heightened politicisation of "Europe" within domestic UK 
politics and a reflection of UK anxiety that the ambitions for the EU in some 
European capitals compromised the core role of NATO. 
Foreign policy and defence was a minor element in the Brexit debates leading 
up to the referendum itself. Advocates for withdrawal claimed the prospect 
of a European 'army' was on the horizon and that the UK was being dragged 
into a federalised military structure. For them this represented an 
unacceptable compromise of the UK's strategic independence. These 
concerns had practical consequences for EU and UK policy makers who were 
acutely anxious not to stir the sometimes fervid imagination of EU 
opponents. UK ministers and officials were therefore not just to be found 
among those advocating against deeper defence cooperation in an EU 
context. Additionally, they were determined to hold the line against any 
developments which could be characterised as further integration and thus 
often frustrated even practical means by which existing cooperation might be 
made more effective.  
With the decision to withdraw, both the EU and the UK now face an 
enormously challenging dilemma: how to create a partnership, which both 
sides implicitly acknowledge as being necessary to their respective interests, 
while at the same time dealing with the realities of the UK as a 'third 
country'.3 Paradoxically, for some in the EU, the UK's withdrawal – while 
entailing a substantive drop in the Union's material defence capacity – also 
represents an opportunity. The absence of the UK, so it is argued, will allow 
the Union to pursue deeper defence cooperation without British 
 
2 Lee David Turpin, 'UK-EU Military Cooperation and Brexit from a Neoclassical 
Realist Perspective: No Big Deal?' in Cornelia-Adriana Baciu and John Doyle (eds) 
Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe (Springer 2019) 3-27. 
3 Cornelia-Adriana Baciu and John Doyle (eds) Peace, Security and Defence Cooperation 
in Post-Brexit Europe: Risks and Opportunities (Springer 2019). 
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obstructionism and vetoes.4 Since the Brexit vote, in fact, we have already 
witnessed a substantial acceleration and deepening of EU cooperation, 
including the initiation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 
the field of defence. For its part, the UK, determined to maintain if not 
augment its global standing, seeks a unique bilateral relationship with the EU 
to address shared threats. This is also seen as necessary in London to ensure 
close NATO-EU cooperation and to forestall the threat of closer EU 
cooperation destabilising balances within the Atlantic Alliance. It is as yet an 
open question as to whether these two sets of aims can, in fact, be brought 
into alignment. 
What has been remarkable in the Brexit negotiations is the extent to which 
security and defence – identified early on as being among the strongest cards 
in the UK's negotiating hand – has been missing from the Brexit 
negotiations. As we shall see, this was not for want of trying. In the earliest 
dispatches from London the need for an ongoing security and defence 
partnership was clearly flagged and UK negotiators came perilously close to 
being seen as consciously using this as leverage in the wider EU-UK talks.5 In 
the end, of course, the EU's absolute determination to forestall any 
negotiations over the future relationship prior to settling the terms of 
withdrawal triumphed. This left the UK's defence card as yet unplayed but 
its shadow is clearly evident in the non-binding Political Declaration which 
was appended to the Withdrawal Agreement.6  
This article thus opens with a brief review of the UK's central place in 
European security and defence but highlights its ambivalent position towards 
security and defence cooperation within the EU. It tracks the impact of 
Brexit on EU debates and the catalytic effect that this appears to have had on 
 
4 Peter van Ham, 'Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe. A scenario study' 
(2016) <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Brexit%20Report% 
20February%202016.pdf> accessed 8 September 2019.  
5 Carina O'Reilly, 'May's warning to EU over security has been called blackmail – but 
it's more likely a bluff' (The Conversation, 31 March 2017) 
<http://theconversation.com/mays-warning-to-eu-over-security-has-been-called-
blackmail-but-its-more-likely-a-bluff-75492> 8 September 2019.   
6 The draft repeatedly underlines the UK's ambition to retain close engagement 
with EU foreign, security and defence policy. Its prominence suggests that will be 
a major point of discussion in subsequent negotiations on a final agreement.  
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a substantive acceleration in EU defence cooperation over the last three 
years. After highlighting the need for a continued security and defence 
partnership, the article goes on to identify – first from an EU and then from 
a UK perspective – the possible scenarios for such cooperation. It notes the 
very limited intersection of these scenarios and sets out the likely horizon for 
future negotiations. It concludes by suggesting that both partners – while 
suffering a net loss as a result of Brexit - nonetheless have vital strategic 
interests in crafting a new bilateral partnership.  
II. THE STARTING POINT  
As noted, the UK leaves the EU having shaped the development of the 
Union's foreign and defence capacities almost from their inception. Indeed, 
the UK was even for a time a champion of deeper defence cooperation, 
launching in 1999, alongside France, the process which led to the creation of 
the CSDP itself. However, with the Conservative Party in office from 2010 – 
long subject to bitter internal divisions over "Europe" – that position gave 
way.7 In part this was a function of longstanding British exceptionalism, 
characterised by its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, its 
leadership role in NATO, its bilateral relationship with the United States and 
its global ties to the Commonwealth. Within the EU the UK was also at the 
core of the triumvirate – alongside France and Germany – that shaped policy 
and institutional development. At one and the same time, the UK offered 
leadership to those Member States less enamoured of Franco-German 
ambitions and determined to respect the intergovernmental nature of 
decision making. The UK also offered a geo-strategic balance to French 
policy priorities, providing an often more wholistic global perspective to a 
sometimes more Africa-centric French approach.  
While the substance of the arguments surrounding the EU's debates on 
foreign, security and defence policy remain much the same, the UK's 
withdrawal has shifted the balance between them quite substantially. All eyes 
 
7 Clare Marina O'Donnell, 'Britain's coalition government and EU defence 
cooperation: undermining British interests' (2011) 87(2) International Affairs 419-
433; Richard G Whitman, 'The UK and EU foreign, security and defence policy 
after Brexit: integrated, associated or detached?' (2016) 238(1) National Institute 
Economic Review R43-R50. 
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now look toward Paris and Berlin to determine what dynamics will appear. 
The 'Atlanticist' constituency within the EU – substantially reinforced 
following the 2004 EU enlargement to Central Europe – has lost a big-power 
patron. That coalition is no less determined, both individually and 
collectively, to defend the principle and practice of NATO primacy in 
security and defence matters and anxious to retain the UK's engagement in 
continental European defence. Certainly, the voices of both the Commission 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
and Vice President of the Commission (HRVP) are in the ascendant within 
EU defence debates, freed of their anxiety not to aggravate domestic British 
sensitivities. In sum, the UK's departure has sharpened internal debates and 
shifted the centre of gravity towards greater EU strategic autonomy.  
For both the Union and the United Kingdom, Brexit is a net loss for 
European defence and security. Both parties will see their geopolitical weight 
reduced; the UK's substantially and the EU's significantly. The loss for the 
UK will be all the sharper by reason of the loss of the EU's collective weight 
behind particular UK policy priorities, while the Union will be less capable of 
representing a comprehensive European view. In practical terms too, both 
sides lose. EU policy making will lose the contribution of the UK's global 
diplomatic and intelligence networks as well as its full-spectrum military 
capacity (accounting for an estimated 20-25 per cent of total EU capacity8) 
and one of the two permanent European seats at the UN Security Council. 
The UK has also contributed important enabling capabilities to the CSDP, 
notably the use of the UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood 
which commanded the EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta (which has since 
moved to Spain) as well as particular strategic assets such as tactical airlift and 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacities, airborne early-
warning and control aircraft and unmanned aircraft systems. At over €40 
billion, the UK also spends more on defence than any other EU Member 
 
8 J Black, A. Hall, K. Cox et al. Defence and Security after Brexit: Understanding the 
Possible Implications of the UK's Decision to Leave the EU (CA: RAND Corporation, 
2017); Jan Joel Andersson, Daniel Fiott and Antonio Missiroli (eds) After the EU 
Global Strategy – Consulting the Experts: Security and Defence (European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 2016) <http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/ 
article/after-the-eu-global-strategyconsulting-the-experts-security-and-defence/> 
accessed 1 May 2019. 
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State and its defence budget is the fifth largest in the world.9 For its part, the 
UK will lose its often decisive input to the framing of a collective European 
policy platform as well access to the Union's developing foreign policy and 
defence infrastructure including the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee, the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), Europol, EEAS, and their myriad of 
technical and support units and programmes. Absent any agreement, the UK 
will also be excluded from existing and new EU research, development, 
industrial and procurement programmes in the realm of defence.  
At the same time, both parties have a deep-seated self-interest in maintaining 
the closest possible strategic relationship, especially at a time when Europe 
as a whole faces a deteriorating security environment. They share priorities 
and interests across the entire spectrum of foreign, security and defence 
policy. With both the Union's 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS) and the UK's 
2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review they speak in common terms of 
addressing issues such as radicalisation, terrorism, state failure, active 
Russian destabilisation of the EU's eastern partners and cyber security, all 
while seeking to strengthen the rule-based global order. Both actors also 
prioritise meeting broader global challenges, including migration, climate 
change and global health security, from a shared base of principle and 
practice. Nothing suggests any change to their respective threat assessments 
arising directly from Brexit. Moreover, given their shared history, location, 
exposure and interests, there is nothing on the horizon to suggest any 
medium or longer-term re-evaluation.10 
The EU and UK also share a concern with the trajectory of the United States 
and the impact of US policy towards NATO.11 The US question essentially 
boils down to whether or not the policies pursued by President Donald J. 
Trump represent a temporary aberration or a logical culmination of evolving 
 
9 Noel Dempsey, 'UK Defence Expenditure' (2018) Briefing Paper Number CPB 
8175, House of Commons Library . 
10 Nick Wright, 'Brexit and the re-making of British foreign policy' (2017) Working 
Paper, UCL European Institute, London, 13 December. 
11 M. Chalmers, 'UK foreign and security policy after Brexit' (2017) RUSI Briefing 
Paper, Royal United Services Institute, London; L. Freedman, 'Brexit and the law 
of unintended consequences' (2016) 58(3) Survival 7–12. 
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US policy towards NATO over the last number of decades. President 
Trump's widely flagged ambivalence towards NATO and his transactional 
approach to Alliance members' defence spending have raised European 
anxieties and prompted calls for intensified European defence cooperation.12 
The associated European debate, however, is divided between those who see 
the urgent need for Europe to take on greater responsibility for its own 
security – at a minimum in terms of hedging against the prospect of US 
disengagement – and those that fear that any moves in that direction will 
actually accelerate a weakening in the US commitment. Those debates, 
common to the Member States within both NATO and EU contexts, are 
now profoundly rebalanced as a result of Brexit, with the UK facing the 
prospect of being an EU outsider at precisely the moment when it sees the 
urgent need to ensure that EU Member States do not take steps which it 
might see as undermining European and transatlantic solidarity.  
The UK's outsider status in these forthcoming EU debates will have material 
consequences for the direction of these debates and their conclusions. 
Already, the row over the exclusion of UK contractors from the Galileo GPS 
system has highlighted the legal, strategic and diplomatic consequences of 
'third country status.'13 Without deep institutionalisation, a drift in bilateral 
EU-UK relations is inevitable – with potentially serious adverse strategic 
consequence for both parties.   
Meanwhile, the EU is proceeding to develop and further institutionalise its 
security and defence capacity. The EU's Global Strategy was launched in late 
June 2016, just days after the Brexit referendum result was declared. Speaking 
later, the High Representative spoke of the extensive advice she had received 
to delay if not even cancel the launch. The Union, so it was argued, had 
suffered a body blow and now was the time to reflect, regroup and then 
reconsider a diminished Europe's place in the world. Federica Mogherini did 
not take that advice. Indeed, she took the opportunity to assert the even 
 
12 Federico Fabbrini, 'Do NATO Obligations Trump European Budgetary 
Constraints' (2018) 9 Harvard National Security Journal 121; Jolyon Howorth, 'EU–
NATO cooperation: the key to Europe's security future' (2017) 26(3) European 
Security 454-459. 
13 Monica Horten, 'Britain will be scrambling hard to put Galileo at the centre of a 
new security partnership' (2018) LSE Brexit 1-3. 
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greater urgency in Europe's need to marshal its capacity to meet existential 
challenges both at home and abroad.14 She noted the calls from a variety of 
European leaders for a strengthening of the Union's international capacity. 
She also highlighted the breadth and depth of public support for the Union 
to reinforce its cooperation in the fields of defence and security and she 
described the enormous potential for such cooperation in delivering greater 
overall security and defence capacity at lower costs to national governments. 
In sum, she described the low hanging fruit that security and defence offered 
to the European project at a moment of existential crisis. 
This marked the beginning of a process in which a detailed implementation 
plan for security and defence was swiftly drawn together.15 These efforts also 
worked with the grain of longstanding EU Commission ambitions to develop 
the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).16 Dating 
back to 2007, the Commission had been pressing an agenda for investment 
and research in new technologies and systems which would deliver greater 
security and defence capacities to the Member States. In addition – and in 
the post-Brexit political storms – several Member State governments and 
prime ministers/presidents went on the record to declare their support for 
more ambitious goals in the field of security and defence.17   
Federica Mogherini's implementation plan for the EU Global Strategy did 
indeed pluck a fair bushel of CSDP fruit. It has pursued a re-engineering of 
 
14 Federica Mogherini presents the EU Global Strategy (29 June 2016) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nj55LNZtuVM> last accessed 8 September 
2019. 
15 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Council of the European Union (14 
November 2016) <14392/16 https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_ 
implementation_plan_st14392.en16_0.pdf> last accessed 8 September 2019. 
16 'A Strategy For The European Defence Technological And Industrial Base' 
(Brussels, 14 May 2007) <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/ 
strategy_for_the_european_defence_technological_and_industrial_base.pdf> last 
accessed 8 September 2019. 
17 'France, Germany to table defence plan at Bratislava ministerial meeting' 
(Euractive, 2016) <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/france-
germany-to-table-defence-plan-at-bratislava-ministerial-meeting/> accessed 9 
September 2019; Andrew Rettman, 'Italy lays out vision of EU army' (EU Observer, 
2016) <https://euobserver.com/foreign/135235> accessed 8 September 2019. 
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the 'battlegroups' concept and funding,18 raised the prospect of central EU 
funding for military operations (replacing the complex ATHENA funding 
mechanism),19 and boosted the budget and role of the European Defence 
Agency.20 It has also secured an EU-NATO Declaration on Strategic 
Partnership,21 initiated a coordinated annual review on defence budgeting 
and planning (CARD),22 instituted new operational structures in 
civilian/military planning and conduct capability (MPCC),23 and set up 
permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) in the field of defence.24 This 
latter initiative has created a sub-group of 25 Member States within CSDP 
dedicated to the completion of 34 specific capacity-building projects. 
Critically too, this activity has been fused onto the Commission's EDIDP25 
 
18 Jan Joel Andersson, 'Adapting the Battlegroups' (2017) European Institute for 
Security Studies Issue Alert 1-2. 
19 'The Arrangement for Cooperation between the European Defence Agency and 
the ATHENA Mechanism' (Brussels, 1 February 2019) <https://www. 
eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/arrangement-for-cooperation-
between-eda-and-the-athena-mechanism.pdf> accessed 8 September 2019. 
20 Pierre Haroche, 'Supranationalism strikes back: a neofunctionalist account of the 
European Defence Fund' (2019) Journal of European Public Policy 1-20. 
21 'Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation' (10 July 2018) <https://www. 
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156626.htm> last accessed 8 September 
2019. 
22 'Council Recommendation of 15 October 2018 concerning the sequencing of the 
fulfilment of the more binding commitments undertaken in the framework of 
permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and specifying more precise 
objectives' (15 October 2018) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? 
uri=CELEX:32018H1016(01)> last accessed 8 September 2019. 
23 COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2017/971 determining the planning and conduct 
arrangements for EU non-executive military CSDP missions (8 June 2017) 
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017D097 
1> last accessed 8 September 2019 
24 'Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to the Council and 
to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' 
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf> last 
accessed 8 September 2019. 
25 'Commission implementing decision on the financing of the European Defence 
Industrial Development Programme and the adoption of the work  
programme for the years 2019 and 2020' (19 March 2019) 
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programme and an ambitious proposed agenda of €40+ billion in new 
spending on research and development on defence technologies and the 
design and procurement of associated defence systems over the next seven to 
eight years. All of this is directed towards a profound deepening of defence 
cooperation and even defence integration in some areas, although it falls 
short of the shared defence of European borders which is still provided by 
NATO for most EU Member States.  
It is important to note too that this new phase of intensified defence 
cooperation is not being constructed solely within the traditional 
intergovernmental structures which the UK championed and defended. As 
has been noted above, the EDF, for example, is an initiative of the 
Commission with a significant decision-making input and authorisation by 
the European Parliament.26 As a result, its management, decision-making and 
funding will be subject to the Community method, inevitably complicating 
potential efforts to engage third countries such as the United Kingdom. Even 
though PESCO is situated within the intergovernmental decision-making 
structures of the CSDP, it too has a supranational dimension with privileged 
access to EDF funding and the associated engagement of the European 
Parliament. So, starting from this base, what then can be foreseen in terms of 
the future EU-UK security and defence relationship? 
III. SCENARIOS AND OPTIONS   
The key point of departure for any discussion on the bilateral security and 
defence relationship is that – like the rest of the Brexit agenda – the 
relationship can only deteriorate.  Even with the best will in the world on 
both sides and an entirely (and unlikely) benign geostrategic context, the EU 
and UK must negotiate a relationship that will be less close, less integrated 
and less mutually reinforcing than that which they currently enjoy. Thus, any 
newly established bilateral relationship can only entail a minimisation of 
costs – there is no significant added-value to either party. A second key point 
 
<https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/34515/attachments/2/translations/en/
renditions/native> accessed 8 September 2019. 
26 'A European Defence Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe's defence 
capabilities' (7 June 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1508_en.htm> accessed 8 September 2019. 
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in framing potential scenarios is that maintaining security and defence 
cooperation – especially at this moment in the CSDP's evolution – will face 
the exceptionally stiff headwinds of unravelling the UK from the Union's 
trade and economic framework.27 This has, for example, obvious and complex 
implications for trade and economic sanctions already in place to address 
foreign policy challenges or additional sanctions which may be sought in the 
immediate future.28 Even more significantly, however,  is the fact that the UK 
will be excising itself from the Union's market and industrial and research and 
development (R&D) policies precisely at the point when the Union applies 
some of their principles to security and defence. As noted, this was 
exemplified in the controversy surrounding UK access to the Galileo 
project.29 Now these very same arguments and difficulties will apply in a 
multiplying series of defence and security contexts. Finally, building this new 
relationship cannot be divorced from wider political dynamics. As any 
bilateral negotiations on a final relationship between the EU and UK  begin, 
their inevitable twists and turns and underlying political dynamics – positive 
and negative – will undoubtedly impact upon conversations on the security 
relationship.  
The economic/industrial impacts are exemplified in the area of defence 
export controls. Changes here could be a key driver of Brexit's wider impacts 
on defence and security policy. In regulations governing the export of dual 
use goods for example, EU trade policy exercises an 'exclusive competence'. 
To date, the UK control list and licencing system are updated automatically 
with EU policy changes. Any divergence here will be a significant departure 
from European coordination. More generally, with respect to arms exports, 
the EU common position simply sets standards for the control of transfers of 
military goods, and the application of eight 'common criteria' when assessing 
arms exports to avert human rights abuses. Should the UK choose 
significantly to diverge from EU policy here (in the pursuit, for example, of 
new trade deals) it could set up a competitive dynamic between UK and EU-
 
27 See also article by Sacerdoti and Mariani in this journal issue. 
28 Thierry Tardy, 'CSDP: getting third states on board' (2014) 6 European Institute 
for Security Studies Brief 6. 
29 Sophia Besch, 'A Hitchhiker's Guide to Galileo and Brexit' (3 May 2018) 
<https://www.cer.eu/insights/hitchhikers-guide-galileo-and-brexit> accessed 8 
September 2019. 
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based suppliers for markets, with a consequent likely weakening in respective 
priorities for human rights. Finally, there is the area of actual arms embargoes 
instituted by the European Union above and beyond shared UN 
commitments, such as in the cases of Russia and Syria. While not part of the 
'exclusive competence' of the EU, the UK has legislation which makes EU 
sanctions automatically apply at the national level.30 A first set of regulations, 
published in 2019, now establishes an autonomous national regime in the UK 
which operates post-Brexit, but these have already signalled some 
substantive divergence from their EU analogues.31 As a third country, the UK 
will lose decisive influence over EU embargo decision making, although like 
Norway it may seek means by which to consult on them. 
1. EU Scenarios 
For the EU, the potential scenarios for the UK's future relationship with the 
EU essentially revolve around two core facts: that the UK will be a third 
country but at the same time a strategic partner. The UK will become a third 
country from the perspective of the EU CSDP as the inevitable consequence 
of Brexit. This would entail the loss of all foreign, security and defence 
cooperation at EU level, necessarily refocusing such efforts at the bilateral 
level and through other multilateral structures such as NATO and the OSCE.  
Without mitigation, such an eventuality creates not only a significant gap in 
the Union's material capacity and the loss of the UK's considerable input to 
policy making, but it also sets up the prospect for a destabilisation of NATO-
EU cooperation. This, in turn, would likely exponentially worsen the kinds 
of frictions, already evident, which arise from Greek-Turkish relations across 
NATO and the EU. At the same time there are voices within the EU that 
insist that the engagement of third countries within CSDP must be based on 
the equal treatment of such partners. This implies that variable geometry 
cannot and should not be applied to distinguish, say, between Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States as third countries.  
 
30 Erica Moret and Fabrice Pothier, 'Sanctions After Brexit' (2018) 60(2) Survival 60 
179-200. 
31 White and Case, 'Sanctions after Brexit – the first UK sanctions regime's (1 March 
2019) <https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/sanctions-after-brexit-first-
uk-sanctions-regimes> accessed 8 September 2019. 
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Nonetheless, it appears that the Union seeks to go beyond a simple 'third 
country' relationship, declaring that: 'The EU stands ready to establish 
partnerships in areas unrelated to trade, in particular the fight against 
terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign 
policy.'32 While the self-interest of both parties should logically lead them 
together to address shared strategic challenges from a common standpoint, 
we have seen that logic, rationality and self-interest have not been notable 
drivers of Brexit. There is considerable scope to tailor just such a bilateral 
relationship, with a menu of options to ensure consultation, cooperation and 
coordination. At the same time, the Union is determined to maintain respect 
for its legal order and each partner's own decision-making system.  
Whether formal or informal, partnerships have become an established 
feature of EU relations with several key allies and the potential here is 
significant. The Union has a variety of possible templates. Norway for 
example, participates in EU sanctions and also supports EU CSDP 
operations with troops and financing. Informal consultative mechanisms 
thus exist to exchange views on key policy issues. Such a model however does 
not entail full and formal engagement in policy and decision-making. Any 
model that went beyond consultation, cooperation and coordination – one 
which sought to preserve key elements of a 'common' foreign, security and 
defence policy – would be legally, constitutionally and politically challenging 
for the Union.  
2. UK Scenarios 
For the UK the spectrum of scenarios is wider and arguably more complex as 
it also encompasses a wider divergence of domestic preferences. On the night 
of the Brexit vote, senior UK defence officials telephoned their EU 
counterparts to reassure them of the UK's continuing commitment and 
engagement in European security and to insist that Brexit did not represent 
a shift to isolationism. This was also restated publicly at least in part to offset 
any temptation on the part of adversaries that the UK might be resiling from 
its existing security commitments. The UK set out a broad vision of a 'new, 
deep and special partnership' with the EU in a series of seven policy-based 
 
32 European Council, 'Conclusions: Negotiating Guidelines for Brexit' EUCO XT 
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papers published in September 2017. In the Foreign Policy, Defence and 
Development paper,33 the UK Government underscored the 
complementarity of UK and the EU's foreign policy priorities – to such an 
extent that one analyst noted that that these nearly appeared to make 'a case 
for being part of the EU, rather than setting out a "new" arrangement.'34  
The document was said by one senior official in an off-the-record briefing, to 
be deliberately 'forward leaning', reflecting bilateral feedback from EU 
partners as to what they sought from a post-Brexit UK. It was also at the 
limits of what the British political system could offer. British officials 
however quickly acknowledged that the proposal landed badly in Brussels, 
where they were immediately characterised as demanding the benefits of 
membership without its obligations. The document went to great lengths to 
itemise what it was that the UK would bring to the table in the context of 
negotiations to establish 'a deep and special relationship' in the field of 
security and defence. It is notable that within the 22-page document the first 
17 are devoted to a laundry list of the UK's contributions to, and strengths 
within, global affairs. The final few pages then set out the general principles 
from which the UK wished to establish a new bilateral framework. In the 
realm of defence and the CSDP specifically, the UK was seeking: 
 Consultation on common CFSP positions, particularly in the field of 
sanctions; 
 Participation in civil and military crisis management CSDP missions, 
including their political and strategic planning; 
 Engagement in defence industry financing programmes such as the 
Preparatory action on defence research (PADR), the European 
defence industrial development program (EDIDP), PESCO, and the 
future development of the EDF; 
 
33 HMG, 'Foreign policy, defence and development: a future partnership paper' 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/643924/Foreign_policy__defence_and_development_paper.pd
f> last accessed 8 September 2019 
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 Working with the EU in the field of space and dual-use technologies, 
particularly in the framework of the Galileo and Copernicus 
programmes; and 
 Participation in the Union's emerging defence market and 
collaboration with the European Defence Agency (EDA). 
On 9 May 2018, the UK Government published its 'Framework for the UK-
EU Security Partnership'. It reflected on the ambitions set out the previous 
September, but now set these against the progress achieved towards the 
Political Declaration associated with the formal Withdrawal Agreement.35 
Therein, the acknowledgement of the EU's autonomy of decision-making 
finally entailed formal recognition that the UK could no longer aspire to 
direct engagement in collective decision-making. Nonetheless, it called for a 
unique and deep relationship that went well beyond the EU's traditional 
relationship with other third countries. A series of options are set out which 
encompass regular and structured consultations at all political levels, an 
exchange of officials, and agreement on the exchange of sensitive material. 
The option to participate in CSDP missions with associated planning and 
command roles is also raised, as is engagement with EDA planning, the 
option of participation in PESCO, EDF and other specific programmes 
(including Galileo).  
Notwithstanding this official outline of a special relationship with the EU, 
the motif of "Global Britain" has been in the ascendant. Thus, the first UK 
scenario for consideration is based on the ambition for the UK to carve out a 
new role for itself as an essentially liberal, free trading state focusing on 
traditional partners (the US and the Commonwealth) as well as so-called 
rising powers such as China and others in the far-east. It therefore assumes a 
de-centring of UK foreign policy away from a European to a greater global 
perspective. This has prompted much speculation, for example, about the 
scope for refocused UK attention to the so-called 'Five Eyes' intelligence 
 
35 HMG, 'Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership' (May 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/705687/2018-05-0_security_partnership_slides__SI__FINAL. 
pdf> accessed 20 September 2019. 
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partners and the broader Anglophone world.36 In her pivotal 'Lancaster 
House' speech on 17 January 2017, the then Prime Minister Teresa May had 
insisted that in their vote to leave the EU, the British people had voted 'to 
embrace the world' based on its history, its exceptionalism and its potential.37 
The contradictions between this and the above-outlined special relationship 
with the EU is obvious and has entailed demands from the British side to find 
solutions that are both 'creative' and 'practical' and which entail 'new 
thinking' and the need to be 'imaginative' to square the obvious circles.38 
The US plays a special role in this Global Britain scenario in both trading and 
strategic terms. Strategically, it is envisaged here that the 'special 
relationship' – always a problematic construction from the US side – can 
come to play a more meaningful role in British foreign and defence policy, 
with the two Anglophone powers working in concert globally in pursuit of a 
liberal trading regime and dedication to democratic values.39 Here again the 
question arises of the extent to which the Trump administration's 
mercantilist trade preferences and the President's personal predilection for 
dealing with authoritarian leaders will cut across such a set of norm-based 
ambitions as "Global Britain" would ostensibly seek to pursue. 
Moreover, for some sceptics, the "Global Britain" brand has already been 
linked to a less attractive 'Empire 2.0' strategy, relying on historic ties which 
are either long-past their sell-by date or else profoundly misunderstood and 
misrepresented within the British discourse.40 This is specially the case for 
 
36 Claudia Hillebrand, 'With or without you? The UK and information and 
intelligence sharing in the EU' (2017) 16(2) Journal of Intelligence History 91-94. 
37 Speech by Theresa May, Lancaster House (London 17 January 2017) 
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the Commonwealth, China and the US.41 For the Commonwealth countries, 
a British "return" has limited strategic appeal. As a loose association of states 
formerly part of the British Empire, the diplomatic glue which holds the 
Commonwealth together is weak and their shared strategic interests tend to 
the general rather than the specific. For major players such as China and 
Japan a key part of the UK's comparative utility was precisely its membership 
of the European Union and how that could be leveraged through close 
bilateral ties. Much the same is true for the United States at the global level. 
From the US perspective post-Brexit London arguably becomes a less 
valuable diplomatic asset as it can no longer be seen as either a sounding board 
for, or advocate of, shared Atlanticist interests within the EU. 
A second scenario is one in which the UK refocuses itself as an Atlanticist 
mini-hegemon. Reflecting the diminished resources which consecutive UK 
governments have made available to defence,42 this would see the UK 
prioritising itself as having a regional rather than global focus but from a 
firmly Atlanticist perspective. NATO would rest at the centre of UK defence 
policy but from that framework the UK would press its allies to maintain a 
clear hierarchy in which NATO served core defence and security interests 
while EU/NATO members would be encouraged to focus more on soft 
security tasks as well as conflict prevention, management and resolution. 
This would offer a clear division of labour between the two institutions but 
would certainly cut across the declared ambition of a number of EU Member 
States for the PESCO framework. This would also potentially sharpen 
tensions in EU-NATO cooperation, potentially degrading cooperation 
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between the two institutions and reinforcing some of the dynamics evident 
in Turkey's security and defence relationship with the EU.   
A third potential scenario is the UK looking to intensify defence cooperation 
in Europe but from outside the EU. With NATO remaining at the core of its 
defence policy, the UK might then choose to pursue a more proactive agenda 
of working with key European partners and through a variety of mini-lateral 
and bilateral frameworks in pursuit of shared European defence and security 
interests. It might, for example, reinforce its 2010 Lancaster House 
framework with France, and try to replicate this with other key partners such 
as Germany or Poland.43 At their 2018 summit, for example, the French and 
British leaders agreed to create a 10,000-strong military expeditionary force 
which could be ready to deploy by late 2020. Similarly, the UK might look to 
develop the model instituted by President Macron in his 2018 European 
Intervention Initiative (EI2), thus building a network of other military 
frameworks outside the penumbra of the European Union. The UK already 
has significant commitments deriving from NATO, such as its own Joint 
Expeditionary Force, combined joint task forces such as Operation Inherent 
Resolve, and the UK–Netherlands Amphibious Force which the UK might 
decide to augment and further develop. Such models might also be applied 
with a range of other partners. Finally, the UK could seek to extend further 
its bilateral security and defence relationships with both non-EU and EU 
Member States, the latter partly with a view to maximising influence over the 
EU's agenda. 
The fourth potential scenario is one of the aforementioned 'unique' 
partnership with the Union. Here the UK would indeed seek to maintain a 
presence within the decision-making structures of CFSP and CSDP. UK 
political leaders have already mooted options such as maintaining a seat at the 
ministerial table and developing structures to accommodate a formal UK 
input to policy making which would fall short of a UK "vote" but 
accommodate a significant UK "voice" in European councils. This has 
already generated some internal EU debates with the European Council's 
Legal Service commenting, in response to a letter from the Government of 
Cyprus, that no 'outside interference' in the EU's decision-making process 
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could be allowed.44 The November 2018 Political Declaration on the future 
of EU-UK cooperation in defence had spoken about the prospect of 'flexible 
consultation' between the UK and EU and mooted informal structures of 
ministers and officials at 'working' level to facilitate same.45 The Legal 
Services insisted, however, that while informal consultations were always 
possible, no written documents or formal positions deriving from such 
informal consultations could ever be used to shape EU policy. They reassured 
the Cypriot Government that the draft Political Declaration had enshrined 
'strong guarantees [...] written in to ensure that the work of the Council and 
its preparatory bodies is effectively protected from outside interference'.46 
The overlap between these six scenarios is limited and is a function of 
domestic UK political choices, EU Member State dynamics and – perhaps 
most significantly – EU treaties and the acquis.  Within the UK, it is unlikely 
for example, that a close bilateral relationship with the EU in security and 
defence terms would be politically palatable. As with the ongoing trade 
discussions, for Brexiteers, the whole point of the exercise is to disentangle 
the UK from its EU obligations. Similarly therefore, efforts to construct a 
'unique' and close strategic partnership with the European Union will be 
subject to much the same political opposition. This will only be exacerbated 
when any such relationship, from the EU side, would inevitably be predicated 
by demands for political and financial commitments. The 'Norway model' is 
here again illustrative.47 Norway's ad hoc engagement with CFSP/CSDP has 
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delivered cooperation and coordination – where both parties desire the same 
– but its framework for consultation is weak and is profoundly 
asymmetrical.48 While the UK's geostrategic weight is greater and can be 
assumed to garner extra attention in Brussels, two further factors militate 
against early agreement on a strong bilateral arrangement. 
The dynamics of EU Member State interaction within CFSP/CSDP are 
complex. While formally they are structured around a strict 
intergovernmental system of decision making, that system is overlaid atop an 
intense and ongoing political and diplomatic interplay, which is deeply 
institutionalised and has become part of the fabric of Member State foreign 
policies. Within those debates there are – as has been signalled above - 
contrasting views as to how far and how deeply EU foreign, security and 
defence policy integration should proceed. Even on daily policy discussions 
in arriving at a common position on particular issues, the subtleties of 
particular decisions can be a function of many diverse inputs across the EU 
policy agenda. Thus, to "plug-in" a third party to such debates – even at the 
level of policy discussion and absent a formal vote – is at a minimum 
problematic. If such a third party sees itself as necessarily having a distinctive 
and unique weight in such discussions, the issue becomes exponentially more 
complex.49  
However, even if such political considerations could be overcome in pursuit 
of shared strategic goals, the legal and institutional barriers to such a unique 
partnership are formidable. The treaties and the Union's acquis set very 
precise terms for EU relations with third parties and the rights/obligations of 
members which cannot be set aside. To leave the Union axiomatically entails 
a loss of substantive "voice" which can only partially be ameliorated by a 
diverse set of informal diplomatic routines and practices which leave only 
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limited room for influence. Again, in the case of Norway, diplomats and 
officials based in both Oslo and Brussels seek to vindicate Norwegian 
interests through negotiations with the EU institutions, and attempt to 
'work closely' with the EU in CFSP/CSDP issues.50 It is difficult to conceive 
even of an institutionalised system which would at one and the same time 
respect the Union's existing decision making order while accommodating the 
UK's clearly expressed desire for a substantive input and consultation on 
policy making. 
These three limitations to a bespoke or unique bilateral strategic partnership 
are further challenged by the Union's accelerated pursuit of strategic 
autonomy. The concept is one which attempts to walk a fine line between 
strengthening the Union's defence capacity while at one and same time, for 
NATO Member States, maintaining the integrity of the Alliance.51 
Institutionally, as noted above, it includes a review of the use of EU 
'battlegroups', the prospect of central funding for military operations, the 
establishment of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, new 
operational structures in the Military Planning and Conduct Capability 
headquarters and PESCO itself. It is also being defined in the allocation of 
new resources through the European Defence Fund, a new European 
Defence Research Programme (EDRP) and the European Defence 
Industrial Programme (EDIP). The engagement of third countries in both 
PESCO projects and the EDF as a whole has already become an issue of intra-
NATO tension with both the US and Turkey and is likely only to be 
exacerbated with the UK's withdrawal.   
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
There appears to be only one definitive conclusion to be drawn from an 
analysis of Brexit's implications and the potential shape of the EU-UK 
 
50 Mission of Norway to the European Union, 'Norway and the EU' 
(Utenriksdepartmentet, 2019)  <https://www.norway.no/en/missions/eu/about-
the-mission/what-we-do/> accessed 29 August 2019. 
51 Daniel Fiott, 'Strategic Autonomy: Towards "European sovereignty" in defence?' 
(2018) EUISS Issue Brief, No. 12 <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 
EUISSFiles/Brief%2012__Strategic%20Autonomy.pdf> accessed 9 September 
2019. 
 
2019} Brexit and Security 241 
 
security/defence relationship into the future and that is that both parties are 
diminished as a result. The best that can therefore be hoped for is the 
minimisation of the associated costs and the maintenance of a strong 
strategic link.  
For the European Union early analyses suggested that the loss of the UK as a 
Member State left it substantially diminished and further marginalised from 
the emerging geopolitical mainstream. It was more evidence of Europe's 
historical decline and a testament to the need for the Union to lower its 
ambitions to better marry these with its diminished capacity. What we have 
thus far seen, however, is a European Union accelerating its defence 
integration and raising the rhetorical stakes on the goals of that integration. 
Significantly too, new resources have been dedicated to that end - with much 
promised even though little is as yet delivered. This is of course further 
reinforced by European anxiety surrounding the direction of the United 
States and a deteriorating European security environment. While it is 
difficult to ascribe weighted causality to each of these three factors, the 
critical issue is that they are mutually reinforcing towards greater European 
defence integration. 
For the UK, the picture is as yet still too complex to draw a definitive 
conclusion. The absence of any domestic consensus on what Brexit was 
meant to deliver frustrated early on efforts to divine what the shape of the 
UK's post-Brexit security and defence relationship with the EU might be. 
Simple disengagement ran with the grain of much Brexit sentiment but was 
contrary to stated UK strategic interests and the expressed goals of the UK 
Government, particularly as eventually defined in the Political Declaration. 
At the same time, attempting to square that circle by seeking a 'bespoke' 
relationship satisfied neither – at least within the Union's own political and 
legal parameters.  
Brexit has also shifted sensitive political balances within the EU. In the 
absence of a common strategic culture, EU Member States still differ 
between those that prioritise migration and instability from the south and 
those that emphasise the need for collective territorial defence from Russia 
in the east. There is further differentiation between convinced Atlanticists 
and determined Europeanists for a definition of EU strategic autonomy and 
whether this amounts to hedging against the prospect of US withdrawal, a 
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necessary reinforcement of NATO or even an emancipation from 
dependence upon a fickle United States. The withdrawal of a more globally-
facing UK may also temper the Union's own ambitions, perhaps contributing 
to a more parochial Union or re-orienting the Union closer to its own 
immediate hinterland of Africa and Eurasia at the expense of engagement in 
the Far and Middle East.  
One might in such circumstances expect that traditional engine of European 
integration, Franco-German cooperation, to engage further gears in response 
to the loss of the UK. Thus far this has not been the case. The dynamic 
between Paris and Berlin has not yet delivered a coherent programme of 
policy responses to the broad EU agenda – and certainly delivered even less 
in foreign and defence policy terms. The fact that President Macron has 
created his European Intervention Initiative outside the EU context is a 
portent of his own frustration at the pace of development of the CSDP in 
operational terms (and the over-inclusiveness, in French minds, of PESCO). 
Certainly, these two partners have not as yet built meaningfully from the 
relaunch of their Aachen Treaty. They have not as yet substantively 
addressed the practical issues surrounding deeper CSDP/CFSP engagement. 
Thus, in such a fluid context, it is only possible to try and outline the most 
basic parameters of the precise "win-set" between the variety of scenarios 
sketched out above. If we exclude the extreme outcomes – a full breach 
between the UK and EU or UK integration within CSDP – we have seen that 
the outline of a potential framework for cooperation clearly exists. The EU 
already has security partnerships which facilitate third party contributions to 
civilian and military missions and defence cooperation. These, however, do 
not yet encompass a strategic input to policy planning and decision-making 
such as within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) or the Foreign 
Affairs Council (FAC). As also noted, the Political Declaration (Articles 92-
104) has affirmed the EU's willingness to grant the UK only an informal role 
in CSDP. 
Sven Biscop, among others, has by contrast proposed an 'opt-in' model for 
the UK in respect of the CSDP/CFSP, including a non-voting seat in the FAC 
when discussing operations with direct UK involvement. This 'pay and play' 
model has potential, if it can logically address the issue of the UK as a third-
party being treated differently to Norway, Turkey or the Union's existing 
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security partners such as Montenegro, Serbia or Switzerland.52 Such a unique 
position would also likely entail continued UK contributions to the Union's 
security and defence budget, likely raising political storms in London. While 
most EU Member States would certainly welcome continued UK 
involvement in CSDP operations, the Union would certainly not 
countenance the use of UK vetoes.  
On the more operational side of defence policy the prospects for ongoing 
cooperation are perhaps brighter. An association agreement between the UK 
and the EDA might be part of such a menu, as might access to a limited range 
of PESCO projects, again on a 'pay to play' basis. Therefore, in the short to 
medium run post-Brexit, the expectation must be that the UK will maintain 
its commitments to European security and defence, both through NATO 
and a much-intensified series of bilateral and minilateral defence 
engagements.  Where possible and where practicable, the UK will also engage 
actively in those EU agencies, programmes and policies where third-country 
participation is available. This will potentially build a pattern of bilateral 
good-faith cooperation that, over time, may then be institutionalised or 
packaged within a wider bilateral framework. It is therefore not likely that 
the ambitious scope for bilateral defence cooperation, set out in the UK's 
September 2017 framework, will be pursued in the negotiation of the future 
relationship. For the moment, therefore, the UK's road to Brussels will be 
diverted through NATO headquarters and 27 national capitals.   
The UK will continue be a major European power – with global ambitions – 
for some time to come. The European Union is visibly moving towards to a 
more integrated foreign, security and defence policy, with a high level of 
ambition, albeit not yet sustained by commensurate resources and political 
will. These two European actors also share too much to work in isolation or 
potentially at cross purposes. Whether that cooperation is structured 
bilaterally through NATO or multilaterally in ad hoc structures and 
frameworks remains to be seen but work together they must if they are to 
meet their respective goals. The overriding question to such a comparatively 
benign scenario is how the associated variables to EU-UK defence 
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cooperation will be impacted by the degree of success/failure of the wider 
negotiations on the shape of the future EU-UK relationship.
